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THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE
EQUITABLE DECREE.
FOPMIGN D~cp.x As CAUSx ov ACTIoN.
NYONE whom the study of equity has led into the by-paths of
V Canon Law will recall that the Sext ends with a splendid
array of imposing maxims, not improbably the source of the
Latin maxims with which every lawyer is familiar. The inveterate
habit formed by the ecclesiastics of expressing a legal principle in
a short and crisp formula persisted when they came into the courts
of law and is peculiarly in evidence among the chancellors of the
fifteenth century2 What may at first have been merely casual be-
came through repetition a habit and the result has been to fasten
upon equity a group of maxims which, though they have long out-
lived the usefulness of their short day, persist vigorously in text-
books and decisions. The difficulty with the maxim is not only that
it expresses a result rather than a reason ;3 almost without exception
the maxims took shape in an environment utterly different from that
of today. While equity has advanced the maxim tends to remain
stationary; hence any exposition of equity-through maxims involves
the danger of obscuring its true development through envisaging
modern equity under the limitations of its medimval beginnings.
Of all the maxims, none has a more interesting history, none speaks
I De Regulis Iuris [V. xii], in s.exto (Corpus luris Canonici (ed. Friedberg) II:
1 122.)
2Cf. Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 Harv. Law Rev. 834.
3 "It seems to me that legal maxims in general are little more than pert headings
of chapters. They are rather minims than maxims, for they give not a particularly great,
but a particularly small amount of information. As often as not, the exceptions are
more important than the so-clled rules." Stephen, History of the Crilmnal Law, 11:94,
n. z. Cf. Jeremiah Smith, The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence, 9 Harv. Law Rev. z3.
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more eloquently of the vortex of jealousy, antagonism and rivalry
in which chancery first formulated its doctrines, than 'Equity acts
in personom.'
The influence of this maxim upon commentators on equity ha-
been profound. It is the corner-stone of the theory which treats
equitable interests as purely in personarn; naturally enough Ames'
regarded it as the key to the mastery of equity. I do not wish to
contest the validity of this generalization if it be recognized to have
definite limits. The interaction between procedure and substantive
right has been important in the growth of both law and equity. The
peculiar process of the court of chancery and the stress.which, as
a 'court of conscience', it laid upon the duty of the defendant un-
doubtedly resulted in the imposition of an ethical standard higher
than that of courts of law. But, ,although modern equity retains
much of the machinery of the ancient court of chancery, it scarcely
follows that it is subject to all the old limitations and weakness. 5
The paradoxical contradiction between the substance of the rights
equity enforces and the means of their vindication is misleading.6
When a judge sitting in equity today declares that a foreign decree
ordering the convevance of land creates no obligation but merely a
duty owed by the defendant to the court,7 he is assuming that equity
has made no progress since the time of Coke.
If, hdwever, this maxim has tended to circumscribe equity's de-
velopment, from another aspect it has conferred upon the court
poWei" not possessed by a court of law. Through the coercion of
the person within the jurisdiction chancery has been able to affect
indirectly the title to immovable property in a foreign 8 jurisdiction.
4 The Origin of Uses, Lectures On Legal History, 233.
1 Langdell, while conceding that the element of weakness so evident in early equity
was not necessary to the existence of the jurisdiction, believed it to be inherent. "Any.
one who wishes to understand the English system of equity as it is and as it has been
from the beginning (my italics), must study its weakness as well as its strength." Sum-
mary of Equity Pleading (ed. 2) p. 38, note. The assumption that equity has not
changed and can never change is maintained with a curious defiance of history. The
fallacy of this assumption has never been better exposed than in the well-known diclum
of Jessel, M. R., in Re Hallet's Estate, 13 Ch. Div. 696, 670.
B y almost insensible degrees chancery has enlarged its process until it has given
specific satisfaction to a plaintiff. Ashburner, Equity, 59. In fact some courts have not
waited statutory aid to enforce their decrees in ren. Wait v. Kern River Co., 157 Cal.
16. See discussion in Huston, Enforcement of Decrees in Equity, 24 ff. Even without
this, such has been the development of equity that the court of chancery dues in fact,
if not tbeoretically in law, determine the title to property. It seems therefore futlie to
pretend that the decree may not create a binding obligation.
¢:Magie, J. in Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 56r, 569.
8 The word "foreign," is lused throughout this paper with reference to -the juris-
diction or decree of, and the property situate in, a sister state. Such usage is inexact,
but avoids an awkward circumlocution.
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True it is that chancellors' have invariably disclaimed any right to
adjudicate the title to a foreign res; cases are confined to those in
which the 'conscience of the party' within the jurisdiction is 'af-
fected by some equity', and the foreign title is but 'incidentally in-
volved'. Thus where the holder of the legal title is before the court,
chancery may in consequence of breach of trust, breach of contract,
or of fraud order him to execute a conveyance of foreign land.
10
No doubt the power which the court can exert through its control
over the person has sometimes led to the assumption of jurisdiction
where as a matter of policy it would have bedn better to dismiss the
bill, " ' but the 'jurisdiction' is now too well settled to be longer open
to question. Due to the accidental conferment of jurisdiction in di-
vorce upon courts of equity, another type of case deserves consider-
ation. The court is frequently given power by statute to allocate
the property of the parties divorced; it may therefore order one
party to mortgage or convey land to the other, usually as security
for, or in lieu of, alimony. If the land chances to be in a foreign
state the same problem arises as in specific performance of contract
involving foreign land; for the decree is to be tested by the same
tests that apply to the decree of a court of chancery.'
2 A convey-
ance executed pursuant to such a decree (whether of .specific per-
formance or divorce) is accepted without cavil by the courts of the
situs of the land. But it may happen that the defendant, of whom
the court had personal jurisdiction, succeeds in evading process of
enforcement, and when he is later found in the jurisdictiorl of the
res, suit may be brought against him upon the former decree. The
problem which I wish to consider is the effect which should be given
by the courts of the situs of the land to the foreign decree ordering
9 e. g. Parker, J. in Deschamps v. Miller [x9o8], x Ch. 856, 863.
OPenn v. Lord Baltimore, i Ves. Sr. 444. A collection of English cases will be
found in i White & Tudor, Lead. Cas. Eq. (ed. 8) 814, ff. and Westlake, Private Int.
Law )ed. s) § 172. See also Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 149; Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S.
298; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 6oS. For other American cases see notes
in 67 Am. Dec. 95, and 69 L. R. A. 673. The 'jurisdiction' is so well settled that cita-
tion of authority is almost needless. It has been described as anomalous (Dicey, Con-
flict of Laws (ed. 2) 205), but the anomaly lies in considering legal procedure as the
norm.
2
1 e.g. Taller v. Carteret, 2 Vern. 494. This decision is also open to the objection
that the decred attempts to extinguish by its own force an equitable interest in foreign
land. See Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, x5 Col. Law Rev. 134 ff. Taller v.
Carteret was followed in House v. Lockwood, 47 Hun 532.
"'Fall v. Eastin, 25 U. S. z, x2; Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 56z, 565; Mal-
lette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 418. But cf. Schofield, Full Faith and Comity, zo IlL.
Law Rev. ri, where Mr. Schofield expressed the opinion (p. 28) that the Supreme Court
in Fall v. Eastin "missed the jurisdictional point on which the case turned." His view
(that the Washington court was without jurisdiction) finds little support in authority.
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conveyance. To simplify the matter I propose to exclude all cases
in which both courts do not have personal jurisdiction 3 of the de-
fenidant.
The solution of this problem necessarily involves the clause
4 o0
the constitution which provides that" full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the judicial proceedings of every other state.
Unfortunately the force of this clause is not universally recognized;
it is still the fertile source of litigation which the decisions of the
Supreme Court seem unable to set at rest.'3 Long ago MARSHATIL,
C. J., said"u that "the judgment of a state court should have the same
credit, validity and effect in every other court in the United States
which it had in the State where it was pronounced * * *"; a state-
ment which, as late as 19o7, was regarded as a correct exposition of
the law.17  But, though one still finds a failure to discriminate be-
tween a foreign judgment and the judgment of a sister state,1 8 it
will be generally conceded that the judgment of a competent court
of one state is final and conclusive upon the merits in another,'0
though it is open to attack for want of jurisdiction. Assuming for
the moment that an equitable decree is within the purview -of the
constitutional provision, it therefore becomes necessary to examine
the meaning of jurisdiction when applied to courts of equity.
20
At the very threshold we find a confusion in verbal usage. The
term, jurisdiction, is constantly used in courts of equity as if it were
synonymous with equity itself; thus it is commonly said that no
jurisdiction exists if there is an adequate remedy at law. To such
usage is due the tendency to confound questions of jurisdiction
proper, i. e., the power of the court to hear and decide, with the
totalljr different question of the merits of the decisionu21 Whether
or no the plaintiff upon the principles of equity is entitled to a de-
2. e. the defendant is served personally and is present at the time the decree is
made. No cases of constructive service will be considered.
14 Art. IV, sec. i.
25 Compare Fauntleroy v. Lum, 2Zo U. S. 230 and Kenny v. Supreme Lodge, etc.
(Ill. 1918), 12o N. E. 631. W. W. Cook, Full Faith and Credit, 28 Yale Law Journ.
422 f.
1 6
Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234.
17 Mr. Tustice Holmes in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 237.
'5 See Note by NV. W. Cook in 28 Yale Law Journ. 579.
19 2 Black, Judgments (ed. 2) § 883.
^ American state courts derive their equitable jurisdiction wholly from statute. In
some states the statutory delegation of power is so comprehensive that the jurisdiction
is substantially identical with that of the English court of chancery. In others the
powers are much limited. The states are classified in i Pomeroy, Equity (ed. 3) §§ 282.
288. In discussing jurisdiction I have assumed for the sake of simplicity that the
'court of equity' possesses the same powers as the ancient court of chancery.
21 Hohfield, Relation Between Equity and Law, xi Mich. Law Rev. 537, 568, note 30.
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cree is a question properly cognizable on appeal, but it does not in-
volve jurisdiction as that problem is presented in collateral attack.
In its proper meaning jurisdiction relates not to the right of the par-
ties as between each other, but to the power of the court; it pre-
cedes any question of the merits, and a decision upholding the juris-
diction of the court is entirely consistent with the denial of any
equity in the plaintiff.22 It depends "upon the presentation to the
court * * of a complaint setting forth facts upon which the plain-
tiff claims to be entitled to * * * equitable relief, but it is not de-
pendent upon the conclusion which the judge makes upon -the facts
of the complaint. Whether they create an equitable cause of action,
or create a case within equitable cognizance, is a judicial question
to be decided by the judge to whom application is made. His power
to decide does not depend upon the correctness of his decision. jur-
isdiction is entirely independent of the manner of its exercise. It
involves the power to decide either way upon the facts presented to
the court."23
In last analysis the question of jurisdiction24 involves the "judi-
cial competence of the sovereign." The sovereign may or may not
have delegated the power to deal with a particular class of cases;
thus if the court be one of limited jurisdiction, any act transcending
the limits is void, because such power has not been given. On the
other hand if a court of general jurisdiction 
is concerned, a pre-
sumption of jurisdiction exists, and the question therefore turns
upon the effectiveness of the judgment. An effective judgment
means a "decree which the sovereign under whose authority it is
delivered has in fact the power to enforce against the person to be
bound by it, and which therefore his courts can, if he chooses to
give them the necessary means, enforce against such person.'
25 The
distinction here involved may be illustrated by contrasting ejectment
and specific performance. No court has jurisdiction to eritertain
an action for the recovery of foreign lands, for -the sovereign is
powerless to enforce the decree. The officers of the court cannot be
given authority to act upon the land and to put the plaintiff in pos-
session. On the other hand a decree for specific performance of a
contract to convey foreign land is an effective judgment, for it is
within the competence of the sovereign to enforce such decree in
2 People ex. rel. Gaynor v. McKane, 78 Hun 154, 158.
=Brown, P. J. in People ex rel. Gaynor v. McKane, 78 Hun 154, 159. See also
Folger, J. in Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217, 228-230; x Pomeroy, Equity (ed. 3) § 129.
2' This discussion of jurisdiction is based upon the able analysis of Professor Dicey:
Conflict of Laws (ed. 2) pp. 40 ff.
25 Dicey, op. cit. 41.
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personam against the person of the defendant who is before the
court. If the law of the country where the land is situate will not
permit nor enable the defendant to perform the order of the court,
no decree should be rendered ;26 indeed it is doubtful if jurisdictio,
exists.2 7  But if the law of the situs of the land recognizes a decd
made under compulsion of a decree as a valid conveyance, the de-
cree is an effective judgment and jurisdiction unquestionably exists.
The existence of jurisdiction as thus defined is independent of the
propriety or impropriety of the particular decision, it is likewise
independent of actual success in compelling performance. The
court must indeed possess a power which will normally produce the
result desired. But an obstinate defendant who prefers imprison-
ment to performance, does not by his contumacy oust the court of
jurisidiction, nor does a furtive defendant defeat jurisdiction by suc-
cessful evasion of process of enforcement. For the decree is more
than a mere order to the person; it is a final determination of that
person's obligation and the obligation can scarcely be extinguished
by non-performance. The decree remains effective just as the judg-
ment at law is effective though the judgment debtor is execution-
proof."'
The thesis I wish to present is briefly this: If the defendant is
personally before a court of equity, the court has power to order
him to convey foreign land. Such a decree is an effective judgnent
26Lord Cottenham, in Ex parte Pollard, Mont. & Ch. 239; Westlake, Private Int.
Lam (ed. s) § 172.
17 Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property, 2o Harv. Law Rev. 382, 392.
"' Confessedly this is not the conventional exposition of jurisdiction; for it is usual
to say that the court must have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the snit. The ex-
pression, subject-matter, is so elusive that it seems desirable to avoid it. The uncertainty
of definition will be apparent to everyone who follows the cases. It may simply apply
to the remedy; thus if the plaintiff seeks an injunction, the court has jurisdiction of
the subject-matter. People ex rel. Gaynor v. McKane, 78 Hun 154, 158. Again it may
be taken to mean that "the court has cognizance of the class of cases to which the one
adjudged belongs." Forrest v. Price, 52 N. J. Eq. x6, 24. But as equity is a con-
stantly expanding system the 'subject-matter' should become sufficiently elastic to admit
new classes of cases from time to time. At all events the proper method of controlling
the expansion of equity is through direct and not collateral attack upon the decree. In
In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, the Supreme Court permitted a habeas corpus proceeding
to be used as a means of reviewing a decree upon the merits. If the Court will adhere
to this doctrine, the position I have taken must be qualified; but it is submitted that the
dissenting opinion of Mr. justice Harlan in that case (p. 223) is thoroughly sound. Cf.
Mr. ustice Holmes in Lamar v. United States, 240 U. S. 6o, 64. So far as the cases
considered in the present paper are concerned, jurisdiction of the subject-matter will be
found to exist where the court has power to render an effective judgment. For, though
it be said that the determination of the title to a ,foreign immovable is beyond the juris-
diction of the court because of the subject-matter, this is subject to the well recognized
exception that jtrisdiction of the person confers upon a court of equity power to deal
incidentally with a foreign title.
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and determines conclusively his obligation to convey and this obli-
gation remains binding upon the person of the defendant wherever
found. Such a decree ought to be entitled to full faith and credit at
the situs of the land. Normally the decree will be made to effectuate
some antecedent equity, growing out of trust or contract. But the
constitutional effect of the decree should be independent of the
ground upon which it is made; for a personal decree is equally with-
in the competence of a court which has the defendant within its
power, whatever its ground, and however erroneous. 29  Such
a decree may perhaps be attacked upon the ground that its enforce-
ment would violate some fundamental policy of the laws of the state
where the land is situate, but such a question of policy should not
be confused with jurisdiction. As a preamble to a detailed consid-
eration of these several problems, it may be convenient to notice
some of the more conspicuous decisions in detail.
II.
Burn!ey v. Stevenson (873), 24 Oh. St. 474.
A agreed to convey to B certain land in Ohio. A died without
making the conveyance, and B thereupon brought suit in Kentucky
in a court having general equity jurisdiction against the heirs of A.
The court having jurisdiction of the persons of the heirs, entered a
decree ordering them to convey the land to B, and in default there-
of directing a master of the court to make conveyance. D, wh6 suc-
ceeded to the rights of B, obtained possession of the land to which
he claimed title through the decree and master's deed. P, claiming
in right of the heirs of A, brought an action in Ohio to recover pos-
session of the land. D in his answer set up the Kentucky decree
and master's deed. Held, a good equitable defense. McILwAINE,
J.: "This decree was in personam and bound the consciences of
those against whom it was rendered. In it the contract of their an-
cestor to make the conveyance merged. The fact that the title
which had descended to them was thus held by them in trust for
Evans [B] was thus established by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. Such decree is record evidence of that fact and also of the
fact that it become (sic) and was their duty to convey the legal
title to him. The performance of that duty might have been en-
forced against them in that court by attachment for contempt; and
the fact that the conveyance was not made in pursuance of the order
does not affect the validity of the decree in so far as it determined
"Per Mr. justice Holmes, Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. x, 15.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
the equitable rights of the parties in the land in controversy. In
our judgment the-parties, and those claiming tinder them with no-
tice, are still bound thereby. * * * The courts of this state cannot en-
force that decree by compelling the conveyance through its proces
of attachment; but when pleaded in our courts as a cause of actiun
or as a ground of defense, it must be regarded as conclusive of all
the rights and equities which were adjudicated and settled therein,
unless impeached for fraud. 'i1o
Bullock v. Bullock (1894), 52 N. J. Eq. 56i.3
In suit for divorce brought in New York the court, having juris-
diction of the cause' and the parties, decreed: (I) dissolution of the
marriage; (2) that the husband [H] should pay the wife. [W] $Ioo
per month as alimony; (3) That H should execute a mortgage to
W upon land in New Jersey as security for payment of alimony. H
failed to execute the mortgage as ordered, and made various mort-
gages and conveyances of said lands for the purpose of defeating
W's rights under the decree. W brought suit against H in-New
Jersey, claiming an equitable lien upon the New Jersey lands by
virtue of the New York decree and praying that H be ordered to
execute a mortgage as ordered by the New York decree. H ap-
peared and moved to dismiss he bill. Bill dismissed.
MAGIM, J., said that the decree could not create a lien upon the
New Jersey lands, but confessed that that did not dispose of the
question. The real problem, which he faced frankly, was whether
the decree created a binding obligation which the courts of New
Jersey were bound to respect. The decree was conclusive upon the
status of the parties and if, by the direction to pay alimony an in-
debtedness should arise, an action at law would lie. But he denied
that the decree, so far as it ordered the execution of a mortgage
could create any obligation. "It is a misuse of terms to call the bur-
den thereby imposed upon respondent a personal obligation. At the
most, the decree and order imposed a duty on him. which duty he
owed to the court making them. That court cAn enforce the duty
by its process. but our courts cannot be required to issue such pro-
cess, or to make our decrees operate as process." It is plain that
what led justice MAGE to this conclusion was his view that a state
must have absolute control of land within its territorial limits and
that to recognize a foreign decree as a personal obligation would
impair the integrity of this principle. For he says: "It is scarcely
necessary to observe that a court of New York could not be em-
2 McCune v. Goodtillie, 204 MO. 306, accord.
' Affirming the decision of Bird, V.-C. in 51 N. J. Eq. 444.
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powered to affect by its decree or judgment lands lying within an-
other state. For no principle is more fundamental and thoroughly
settled than that the local sovereignty by itself or its judicial agencies,
can alone adjudicate upon and determine the status of lands and im-
movable property within its borders, including their title and its in-
cidents and the mode in which they may be charged or conveyed.
Neither the laws of another sovereignty nor the judicial proceedings,
decrees and judgments of its courts can in the least degree affect
such lands and immovable property."
GARRusoN, J., concurred in the result but not for the reasons set
forth above. He conceded that any judicial determination which
possessed "the quality of judgment" was under the constitution a
binding adjudication. 2 But "the Supreme Court of New York pro-
nounced as its judgment that the marriage s.ould be dissolved with
the incident of alimony to the complainant. Here the sentence of
the law upon the record ceases." 33 The order, therefore, for the
execution of the mortgage was mere process and "did not possess
any element of a judgment upon the issue submitted to the court for
decision * * *".
VAN SycxL, J., dissented. As the New York court had juris-
diction of the husband and the subject-matter, its judgment was
conclusive "on the right of the wife to have the husband execute a
mortgage upon the New Jersey lands. *** As to the title to such
lands, it had the effect of an admitted legal contract or obligation
by the husband to convey and should be enforced in equity here.
* * * The judgment imposed an obligation upon the husband from
which he cannot relieve himself by removing from the jurisdiction
in which it was rendered: the obligation follows him into this state."
Five judges concurred with MAGI, J., and five with VAN SYCKL4,
J. GA ausoN, J., who cast the decidjng vote, placed his decision upon
a peculiar ground. Stress may be laid upon this fact, for the case
is commonly quoted as authority for the proposition that an equita-
ble decree ordering the conveyance of land does not create a binding
obligation."'
Subsequently W brought an action at law in New Jersey upon the
New York decree to recover alimony accrued. Judgment was given
32It is noteworthy that Justice Garrison drew no distinction between legal judgments
and equitable decrees.
33 The pleasing epithetical solution may be left for those whom it satisfies. But why
did the 'sentence of the law upon the record' cease with the judgment dissolving the mar-
riage with the incident of alimony?
3
4
e.g. Beale, Summary of The Conflict of Laws, § 82, Cases, Conflict of Laws III:
537; Note in 2z Harv. Law Rev. 210.
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for 'W, the court citing with approval the opinion of MAGn,, J., in
the present case.35 The consistency of the two decisions is open to
question. 6
Dunlap v. Byers (1896), iio Mich. lO9.
Suit was brought in Ohio for the dissolution of a partnership. The
court, having jurisdiction of the parties, decreed that the partnership
be dissolved, appointed a receiver and directed him to sell certain
lands in Michigan which were held to be partnership assets. The
decree required the partners to quitclaim to the purchaser from the
receiver. One partner died without complying with the decree and
his heirs brought ejectment in Michigan to recover possession of the
land from the purchaser. The latter promptly brought suit in equity
to enjoin the heirs from prosecuting the action of ejectment and to
compel them to transfer to him the legal title in accordance with the
Ohio decree. Decree, according to the prayer in the bill. It was
contended by the defendants that the decree and sale thereunder
were null and void for want of power in the Ohio court to make
such decree and that such sale could have no effect in Michigan.
LONG, C. J. -The Ohio court "acquired jurisdiction not only over the
parties but the subject-matter, and had the power to adjudicate the
rights of the parties in all the property belonging to the partnership,
although a portion of the same was real estate in the State of Michi-
gan. * * * While the decree itself * * * would not directly effect the
transfer of title, the decree of the court would bind the consciences
of the parties and could be enforced by a court within the territory
where the property was located." (pp. 116, 117).
Fall v. Fall (19o5), 75 Neb. 104, 75 Neb. 12o.
Fall v. Eastin (19O9), 215 U. S. I.
In suit for divorce in Washington the court, having jurisdiction of
the cause and the parties, decreed: (I) dissolution of the marriage;
(2) that certain property in Nebraska be set aside as the separate
property of the wife [W] and that the husband [H] convey such
property to her. In default of performance by H a commissioner
of the court by its authority executed a deed to W, who obtained
possession of the land. H executed a mortgage and deed of the
premises to D.37 W brought an action in Nebraska, setting up the
decree and deed and prayed that the mortgage and deed be cancelled
35Bullock v. Bullock, 57 N. J. L. 5o8. (Opinion by justice Van Syckel.)
36justice Van Syckel is himself perfectly consistent; for he dissented in the first
case.
3T Whether or not D had notice does not clearly appear, but the opinion in Fall v.
Eastin.seems to proceed upon the assumption of notice.
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as casting a cloud on her title and that title be quieted in her. Relief
granted. Affirmed on appeal. Reversed on rehearing.
The reasoning of the court is not entirely clear, but great stress
seems to be laid on the fact that H had conveyed to a third party
and that the decree could have no binding effect on such third party.
The court does not explicitly deny that the Washington decree could
create an obligation binding upon H.88
Upon writ of error to the Supreme Court the final judgment in
Fall v. Fall was affirmed. (Fall v. Eastin). Justices HARIAN and
BrIWER dissented. The majority opinion by Justice McKlm-A is
disappointing. It discloses a tendency to treat -a suit for specific
performance as a real action (pp. 11-12), and great emphasis is
placed on the fact that a domestic decree can have no direct effect
upon foreigni land. It is a little surprising to find the court citing the
discredited case of Hart v. Sanson39 with approval. Doubt is
thrown on Burnley v. Stevenson and it is suggested that the cases
cited do not sustain it, though the court feels it unnecessary to "stop
to review them."4  (p. 14).
Justice HoLmEs concurred specially. He regarded the Washing-
ton decree as creating a personal obligation binding upon the hus-
band and entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska. He then
continued :41
"But the Nebraska court carefully avoids saying that the
decree would not be binding between the original parties had
the husband been before the court. The ground on which it
goes is that to allow the judgment to affect the conscience of
the purchasers would be giving it an effect in rent. It treats
the case as standing on the same footing as that of an inno-
cent purchaser. Now if the court saw fit to deny the effect
of a judgment upon privies in title, or if it considered the
defendant an innocent purchaser, I do not see what we have
to do with its decision, however wrong. I do not see why it
is not within the power of the State to do away with equity
or with the equitable doctrines as to purchasers with notice
23 See report at p. T32, where it is said that neither the opinion of the majority nor
of the minority in Bullock v. Bullock would warrant granting the relief sought.
-" io U. S. xsr. The Supreme Court felt it necessary to "explain" Hart v. Sanson
in Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316. Cf. Putnam, J. in Sav.gs Bank v. Abbot, x3r Fed.
at p. 98o: "Hart v. Sanson has never been taken seriously since it was announced."
40 The lack of clarity in the majority opinion may account for the fact that the case-
has been cited as authority for the proposition that a foreign decree ordering a convey-
ance is an adjudication binding on the courts of the situs. Lamkin v. Lovell, 176 Ala.
334, 343.
U215 'U. S. at p. 15.
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if it sees fit. Still less do I see how a mistake as to notice
could give us jurisdiction. If the judgment binds the de-
fendant it is not by its own operation, even with the Consti-
tution behind it, but by the obligation imposed by equity upor
a purchaser with notice. The ground of the decision below
was that there was no such obligation. The decision, even if
wrong, did not deny to the Washington decree its full effect."
.Aallette v. Scheerer (1916) 164 Wis. 415.
In suit for divorce in Illinois the court, having jurisdiction of the
cause and the parties dissolved the marriage and ordered the hus-
band H to convey to the wife W real estate in Wisconsin in full
settlement of alimony. During the pendency of the action H conveyed
the lana to D who took with notice. Suit by W in Wisconsin against
H and D, setting up the Illinois decree and praying that the deed
from H to D be cancelled and that H be required to convey to W.
H made default in appearance, but D appeared and demurred. De-
murrer overruled.
The court treated the Illinois decree as entitled to the 
same res-
pect as a legal judgment. Decisions upon judgments and decrees for
money were held to apply equally to decrees ordering the conveyance
of land. (pp. 419-420). "The judgment exhibited by the plaintiff
directs Carpenter (H) to convey the title to the Wisconsin real es-
tate to satisfy the judgment for alimony awarded plaintiff. This
method of satisfying a judgment is recognized in this state. We are
led to the conclusion that plaintiff is entitled to the relief in the
courts of this state of enforcing the Illinois decree by the judgment
of our courts."
Both sides of the problem are developed in these cases and the
question therefore remains'whether Burnley v. Stevenson or Bullock
v. Bullock presents the sounder view.42 We may perhaps come nearer
a solution by examining the objections made to the thesis which has
been advanced. It is sometimes said that a court of eauitv is "with-
out power to enforce any but its own decrees, nor can it adjudge
the decree of any other court binding or punish the violation of any
but its own."4 Such an objection is believed to be frivolous.44 The
court is n6t-asked to enforce a foreign decree; it is asked to recog.
nize such decree as affording a binding equitable obligation upon
42 Decisions precisely on the question at issue are few in number, bit if dicta be
considered the preponderance of judicial opinion is against the thesis advanced in this
paper.
43 Adams v. Knapp, 213 Pa. St. 567.
" Cf. Lord Brougham in Houlditch v. Donegal, 8 Bligh N. S. 30r.
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which a new decree may be founded. Certainly if it has power to
enforce its own decrees founded upon contract it has power to en-
force its own decrees founded upon something else. Objections of
this type serve only to obscure the real issue and deserve no 
serious
consideration. It will appear, however, from the foregoing 
cases
that there are two principle objections: (i) that an equitable 
decree
ordering the doing of an act does not create a binding 
obligation;
(2) that a fundamental policy dictates that each state have 
absolute
control of immovable property situate within its territorial limits,
and to admit the binding effect of a foreign decree would impair 
the
integrity of this principle. Let us look at each in turn.
III
The notion that an equitable decree which orders the 
conveyance
of land cannot create a binding obligation is the last survival 
of an
old dogma which is today shorn of most of its force. Considerations
of convenience have compelled the courts to extend the doctrine 
of
res adjudicata to decrees in equity ;4 but though it may 
now be
conceded that a decree is to some extent res adjudicata, 
it may still
be denied that a decree creates an obligation. It therefore 
becomes
important to examine the support upon which the proposition 
rests.
We may not unjustly suspect the influence of Sir Edward 
Coke.
"This Court of Equity," he wrote,-
1 "proceeding by English Bill is
no Court of Record and therefore it can bind but the person 
only
and neither the estate of the Defendant's lands nor the property 
of
his goods and chattels." The two cases cited to support this con-
clusion have received a prominence they scarcely deserve. Extracts
from them follow: "A decree is not like a judgment of the King's
Bench or Common Bench, for such a judgment binds the right 
of
the party; but a decree does not bind the right but only the person to
4
5 Where the question is discussed in general terms, a decree in chancery, 
rendered
upon the merits, is said to be conclusive upon parties as to issues 
directly involved. 2
Black, Judgments (ed. 2) § 517. It is said to be "to every intent as 
binding as would be
a judgment of a court of law." Pennington v. Gibson, r6 How. 
at p. 76. See also
Brown v. Lexington etc. Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 191 (Bill of Account dismissed 
because the
same matter had been adjudicated in New York in equity.); Dobson 
v. Pearce, iz N. Y.
s6 (foreign decree determining conclusively that a domestic judgment 
was obtained by
fraud); French v. Harding, 235 Pa. St. 79 (foreign decree 
determining insolvency of a
corporation and making assessments on stockholders held conclusive 
so far as the in-
solvency and foundation of the assessment were concerned). Among 
the more recent
cases there is observable a tendency to hold that a decree may he 
res adjudicata in a
court of law. Tew v. Webster, z18 Minn. 375.
484 Inst. 84.
'T Y. B. B.'37 H. VI. 13. 3. (part of this case is printed by Ames (Cas. Eq. I:i) as
J. R. v. M. P.); 27 H. VIII. 14. 6.
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obedience, so that if the party will not obey then the Chancellor may
commit him to prison until he will obey, and this is all that the
Chancellor can do."' - 8 "For the Common Law proceeds upon fixed
and invariable rules; the Chancery proceeds upon the discretion of -
good man. A decree there binds the person to obedience, but it does
not operate at all upon the matter in question."'4  It will be noted
that one of these statements is but the fragment of an argument,
while the other comes from a court of law.50 If there is danger in
interpreting equity through the. medium of the common law, that
danger 'becomes infinitely greater when reliance is placed upon the
observations of common law sergeants of four centuries ago. The
old antagonism which moved their speech is passed away. Chancery
has long been a court of record, and it would be difficult to find a
modern judge in equity who would admit that he sat in a court of
conscience,' or gave colour to Selden's vivacious criticism. Had
this ancient authority been left in the peaceful security of Year Book
French, we might not be troubled by it today, but the indefatigable
industry of Coke found vent in Institutes and Chancellor KIlNT
caught hold of his words. "A court in chancery, on its equity side,
is not strictly a court of record. * * * The reason why courts of law
would not take cognizance of decrees is * * * to be deduced from
the history and peculiar jurisdiction of the court of chancery; and
although the reason of the rule may not now be applicable to some of
its decrees, yet we are not at liberty at this day to set aside the rule.
We are bound to declare the law as it has been handed down to us
and the symmetry of our system of jurisprudence will be best pre-
served by resisting innovation."5 2  Kent's view did not prevail in
New York but it found ready acceptance in New Jersey. For when
a statute was there passed giving like effects to decrees for money as
4Ames, Cas. Eq. 1:2, n. x. This extract is from Y. B. 27 H. VIII. 14. 6, the
second of the cases cited by Coke. The statement is made arguendo by Knightly in
answer to the argument of Chomley that as the court of chancery had previously made
a decree in the same cause, it could not reverse its own decree. Deinshill supported
Chomley. Knightly was plainly in the minority. But before the discussion had pro-
ceeded far, the court interrupted them and bade them cease talking of the jurisdiction
of the court. (Le Secretary luy interupt' et dit, ne parlez puis de I'autorite de cest
Court.) The statement quoted is very slender authority.
4 jenk. Cent. Cas. zo8, pL. 9, Ames, Cas. Eq. 1:2, n. x. This is but a summary of
Coke's first case.
5OIt is somewhat strange that Ames overlooked the statement of Bohun. In his
Curss Cancellariae (1715), a decree is defined: "A Decree is a final Sentence or Order
of Court determining the Right of Matters in Question, according to Equity * * (ed.
2, p. 351).
vt Buckley, J. in In re Telescriptor Syndicate Limited [1903], 2 Ch. 174, 195: "This
Court is not a Court of conscience * * * ."
5'Post v. Neafie, 3 Cai. (N. Y.) 22, 35-36.
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to judgments, the court relying upon Kent's opinion, held that a
foreign decree would not support an action of Debt and that the
statute had made no difference in the law.
53 Turning to modem
text-writers, we find that Langdel
4 has carried the proposition to
its logical conclusion;" * * * a decree in chancery has not in itself
(i. e. independently of what may be done under it) any legal opera-
tion whatever. If a debt, whether by simple contract or by specialty,
be sued for in a court of law and judgment recovered, the original
debt is merged in the judgment and extinguished by it, and the
judgment creates a new debt of a higher nature.and of which the
judgment itself is conclusive evidence. But if the same debt be
sued for in the court of chancery (as it frequently may be) and a
decree obtained for its payment, not one of the effects before stated
is produced by the decree."
5 5 From this it is but one step to the
final dogma: "The decree is in its nature not the establishment of
an obligation, but a method of enforcing an obligation,-a mere
form of execution." 56
The broad distinction between decrees on the one hand and legal
judgments on the other finds little support in the cases. To be sure
it was held in Carpenter v. ThorntoZ
5 7 that an action of Debt would
not lie upon a decree of chancery, the decree being a domestic de-
cree, but the decision is generally regarded as unsatisfactory
58 and
is much qualified by the remarks of Lord Tenterden in a subsequent
case.59 As a court of chancery has adequate means of enforcing its
own decrees and does not require the assistance of a court of law
in the same jurisdiction, this precise question is unlikely to arise
today. 0 But in case of the foreign decree the problem is very im-
portant. In Henderson v. Henderson
6 ' an action of Debt was
brought in England upon a decree on the equity side of the Supreme
Court of Newfoundland. The defendant objected that a "decree
for the payment of money by a Court of Equity is not a declaration
'3 Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 18 N. J. L. 184.
r4 Summary of Equity Pleading (ed. 2) § 43, n. 4 (on p. 37).
3 Langdell does not in this passage explicitly deny that a decree may create an equit-
able obligation, but such a denial is implicit in his argument.
"Equitable Decree as Cause of Action in Another State, 25 Harv. Law Rev. 653, 654.
13 B. & Ald. 52.
"See the careful analysis of this decision by Professor Cook, The Powers of Courts
of Equity, 15 Col. Law Rev. 237, ff.
1 Henley v. Soper, 8 B. & C. x6.
6o Some courts, however, accept a domestic decree for money as the basis of an
action of Debt or some similar action. Hohfeld in ii M ich. Law Rev. .68, citing:
Ames v. Hoy, 12 Cal. ss, 2o; Howard v. Howard, S Mass. 196; Dubois v. Dubois, 
6
Cowan 4Q3, 496.
616 Q. B. a8.
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that the plaintiff has any legal right to the money, but only that, upon
certain views peculiar to that Court, the payment ought to be made."
Neither Coke nor Langdell would take exception to such an argu-
ment. But it failed to meet the approval of Lord DENMAN, C. T,
who said:
"The decrees of foreign Courts of Equity may indeed in
some instances be enforceable nowhere but in the Courts of
Equity, because they may involve collateral and provisional
matters to which a court of law can give no effect; but this is
otherwise where the Chancery suit terminates in the simple
result of ascertaining a clear balance and an unconditional
decree that the individual must pay it. The circumstances by
ivhich the Court arrives at that conclusion do not affect the
right of suing in a court of law, which grows out of the legal
duty to pay. An award to pay money, made under a submis-
sion of reference, may possibly be founded exclusively on
equitable considerations; but the parties bound to perform it,
owe the money."0 2
In this country there is no longer the slightest doubt that a de-
cree of one state for a sum certain will support an action at law in
another. The pioneer decision of Post v. Neafie,13 despite KN'S
vigorous dissenting opinion, changed the current of authority."' The
position of the Supreme Court"" upon this question is clear. Nor
does it matter whether the decree be founded upon some antecedent
Tight or equity; for where the right exists solely by virtue of the
decree, the obligation is none the less conclusive and binding.s6 Cer-
tain decrees, therefore, create obligations, legal as well as equitable,
and the old distinction is gone.
It is gone, but in its place we find another. From its very nature
the typical equitable decree cannot be equated to a legal judgment.
In Penington v. Gibson!7 the court merely went so far as' to say
that "in every instance in which an action of debt may be maintain-
t My italics.
"3 Cal. (N. Y.) 22.
SSee authority collected in 5 Enc. Pl. & Pr. zo69; 2 Black, Judgments (ed. 2)
§ 869. Mutual National Bank v. Moore, So La. Ann. 1332; Storage Co. v. Gottstein,
123 Iowa 267.
6 Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 6s.
I*Lynde v. Lynde, 16z N. Y. 405 (affirmed iSz U. S. x83); Sistare v. Sistare, 218
U. S. i, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) xo68. It is now well settled that a foreign decree for ali-
mony creates a binding obligation upon which suit may be brought. If, however, the
decree is subject to modification, it is not a final judgment within the 'full faith and
credit' clause. But suit on such a decree was allowed in Wagner v. Wagner, 26 IX I. 27.
61 16 How. at p. 77.
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ed upon a judgment at law for a sum of money awarded by such
judgment, the like action can be maintained upon a decree in equity
which is for an ascertained and specific amount ** * ." Hence it
is still possible to distinguish between decrees and to argue that the
admission that the decree for money creates an obligation does not
extend to the decree ordering the conveyance of land. There ap-
pears to be no sensible reason for this distinction. The decree as-
sumes substantially the same form68 whether it be for the payment
of money or the conveyance of land; it is formally but an order to
the defendant to do an act, which may be the payment of $I,OOO or
the execution of a deed to Blackacre. Likewise in the matter of
enforcement, aside from statutory innovations, the method is the
same in both types of decrees. Any argument drawn from the form
of the decree or the means by which it is enforced applies equally to
the decree for money.6 9
Nor do courts of equity when" speaking of their own decrees feel
the need of any such distinction. This may be due to the fact that
attention is directed primarily to the power to enforce the decree,
and compelling the conveyance of land is no more difficult than
compellihg the payment of money. But courts go even further and
disclose an innocent belief that foreign courti of equity will recog-
nize their decrees as valid obligations binding at the situs of the res.
So where a decree is made for the conveyance of foreign land, it is
said that the courts of the situs "will treat such a decree as valid
so far as it defines the rights of the parties and will enforce it."
70
Again: "Such decree althoughno conveyance has been executed may
be pleaded as a cause of action or as a ground of defence in the
courts of the State where the land is situated; and it is entitled, in
the court where so pleaded, to the force and effect of record evidence
of the equities therein determined unless it bei impeached for
fraud."7' 1 Likewise in a suit in New York for strict foreclosure of
a mortgage on lands in Illinois, the court declares that its decree
will 'settle the rights in the property' and that the courts in Illinois
will be bound to give it full faith and credit.72 While such confidence
in foreign courts is misplaced in view of the common interpretation
placed upon Fall v. Eastin, this has no bearing upon the point under
"I Seton, Decrees (ed. 3) 607, ff.
69 This is enforced by the fact that the ancient distinction between judgments and
decrees applied equally to all decrees. See an admirable statement in Ashburner,
Equity, 34.
701cBride, C. j. in Williams v. Williams (Ore. 1917), x62 Pac. 834, 836.
7' Cardwell. J. in Vaught v. Meader, 99 Va. 569, 574.
2 House v. Lockwood, 47 Hun 532.
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consideration. Regarding their own decrees, courts place orders to
pay money and to convey land upon the same basis.
But we may go further. There appears to be no difficulty in recog-
nizing the binding force of a foreign decree if a domestic res is nr"'
directly involved. A noteworthy example is the well-known case of
Dobson v. Pearce," where a New York court admitted a Connecticut
decree enjoining suit on a New York judgment, as a valid equitable
defence to an action upon that judgment. The decree was conclusive
evidence that the judgment was obtained by fraud and determined
the obligation not to enforce the judgment even when asserted by the
creditor's assignee. So too in Arkansas,7 4 a decree of Nebraska dis-
missing a bill to set aside a deed to domestic land was held conclu-
sive. The same principle applies where the foreign decree directs
the doing of an act, even the conveyance of land. Thus is the decree
of a court of chancery in Ontario ordering the conveyance of land
in Ontario recognized as creating a good equitable cause of action in
New York. 5 Even New Jersey, which will probably be the last
state in the union to admit that a foreign decree can create a binding
obligation where its own land is involved, finds no difficulty in ac-
cepting a foreign decree ordering the conveyance of foreign land.70
It seems evident therefore that courts of equity in their attitude
toward their own decree and toward foreign decrees which do not
involve a domestic res, brush aside this distinction and recognize the
decree for conveyance as a binding obligation.
So far then as the power of a court of equity is concerned, there
appears to be no reason why a foreign decree should not create a
binding obligation though it concern mediately domestic land; such
seems to be the plain result of Burnley v. Stevenson and Dunlap v.
Byers. But at this point it becomes necessary to notice an ingenious
attempt to explain away the effect of those cases; for it is main-
tained that they are not inconsistent with Bullock v. Bullock.
In the first two cases, so it is said, the obligation grew out of
contract and partnership and the decree was merely conclusive
of such antecedent obligation which existed by the law of the
situs; in the last the foreign court attempted to create an obliga-
tion by its own decree and when "no antecedent obligation ex-
ists by the law of the situs, a decree of another state is without
force, for it cannot create such an obligation as to land outside its
73 12 N. Y. 156.
'
4
Fromholz v. McGahey, 12o Ark. 216.
75 
Roblin v. Long, 6o How. Pr. 2oo.
15 Bennett v. Piatt, 85 N. J. Eq. 436.
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jurisdiction."7 7  This argument possesses a certain plausibility but
it is believed to be unsound. It does violence to the decisions dis-
cussed; for the obligation recognized in both Burnley v. Stevenson
and Dunlap v. Byers was the new obligation created by the foreign
decree. That is the position taken by other courts. Further, even
had the decree been accepted ostensibly as only conclusive evidence
of the obligation, it would be mere play of words to pretend that
the obligation recognized was not the obligati6n arising from the
decree. A rule of evidence which makes a decree conclusive is in
truth a rule of substantive law.75
It is difficult to see why in such a matter as this the effect of an
equitable decree should be different from that of a legal judgment.
The doctrine that a cause of action is extinguished by or merged in
a legal judgment results from the policy that there be an end of
litigation. The same considerations of policy demand that equal
effect be given to the equitable decree, and it is believed that this
conclusion finds adequate support in the cases.
In the first place the now universal acceptance of the foreign
decree, for money can not be rationally explained upon any other
ground. If the doctrine applies to decrees of this type it should ex-
tend to decrees ordering a conveyance. Such was the real basis of
decision in Mallette v. Scheerer. In the second place, if a cause
of action survives a decree, the decree ought not to be a bar to a new
suit upon the old cause of action in another jurisdiction. But in
Harrington v. Harrington79 the foreign decree was held to be a bar
and the same result was reached in the Arkansas case already cited' s°
Finally we may put this theory to an extreme test if a case be found
where the foreign decree was based upon a cause of action invalid
by the law of the forum. The question is no longer open in the
matter of legal judgments, and it is believed that the doctrine of
Fauntleroy v. LuwzsI should apply to decrees in equity. Mr. Justice
HoIas, the author of the opinion in that case, has indicated 2 that
'"Note in 21 Harv. Law Rev. 210.
Is If this distinction possesses real validity it musf apply equally to decrees for money.
But even the courts of New Jersey accept the foreign decree for money, whether or no
it be founded upon an antecedent obligation. Bullock v. Bullock, 57 N. J. L. 5o8. What
the domestic court is asked to recognize is not the old obligation, if one there be, but
the new obligation created by the foreign decree.
7 154 Mass. 577. The decree was held a bar to an action at law. It should be
noted that the courts of New Jersey will recognize their own decrees as bars. Woostcr
v. Cooper, 59 N. J. Eq. 204, 222.
"OSupra, n. 74.
81210 U. S. 230.
82Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, S.
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he would so apply it, and in a recent decision83 in the Circuit Court
of Appeals, SANBORN J. said:
"The Supreme Court has conclusively determined that in
suit upon a judgment or decree of the court of another state,
the same credit and effect must be given to it by the court
in whicfi the suit upon the judgment or decree is brought as
would be given to it in the foreign state, although -the
judgment or decree is founded upon a contract, or trans-
action or action good in the foreign state, but contrary to the
policy of and forbidden under penalties in the state in which
suit upon the judgment is brought."
A soinewhat extended search of the authorities has failed to re-
veal more than two cases which bear directly upon this question.
Suit on a foreign decree, founded upon a cause of action invalid by
the law of the forum was sustained in Beal v. Carpenter." The con-
verse of this situation was presented in Roller v. Murray," in which
suit was brought for specific performance of a contract to convey
lands in West Virginia. The contract also involved land in Virginia
and a previous suit had been litigated between the same parties in
Virginia. The Virginia court dismissed the bill,"" holding that the
contract was champertous and therefore could not be enforced. The
Virginia decree was set up as an answer to the suit for specific per-
formance in West Virginia. To this the complainant objected that
the contract, while invalid in Virginia, was valid by the law of West
Virginia, and therefore the decree was not a bar. The court con-
ceded that the contract, independent of the Virginia decree, was
valid, but held that the foreign decree was conclusive upon the
parties. Here in other words the complainant's cause of action,
otherwise valid in West Virginia, was extinguished by the former
decree. The court further expressed the view that were a Virginia
decree based on a cause of action invalid by the law of West Vir-
ginia made the basis of a suit in West Virginia, it would be entitled
to full faith and credit.
It is believed therefore that the principle involved in Burnley v.
Stevenson and Mallette v. Carpenter is one and the same and that
these decisions, go far as the power of a court of equity to create
a binding personal obligation by its decree, find good support in the
"Beal v. Carpenter, 235 Fed. 273. Cf. Roller v. Murray, 234 U. S. 738, 745.
" 235 Fed. 273.
857x W. Va. x6x.
so Roller v. Murray, 107 Va. 527.
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books. In fact it will be very generally conceded that the decree
may create an obligation, if the enforcement of that obligation does
not in any way affect title to domestic land. It is the anxious fear
that the State may be deprived of control over its own land which
leads to the denial of power in the foreign court. If this fear is not
justifiable the last objection will be removed.
IV
The status of and title to immovable property is 'exclusively within
the control' of the state in which the property is situate. A typical
expression of this principle was quoted in discussing Bullock v.
Bullock.87  Others follow: "It is a well settled principle of law in
the decisions in England and this country, and acquiesced in by the
jurists of all civilized nations, * * * that immovable property, known
to the common law as real estate, is exclusively subject to the laws
and jurisdiction of the courts of the nation or state in which it is lo-
cated. No other laws or courts can 'affect it."88 "The transfer and
devolution of title to real estate within the limits of a state are -en-.
tirely subject to the laws of that state and no interference with it
can be permitted by other states." 89 As a corollary to these pro-
positions it is asserted that a foreign decree cannot have any direct
effect upon' domestic land, neither altering title nor creating a lien,
legal or equitable." This truism is often'enunciated with great sol-
emnityY' Harmless in itself it is made the basis of the further
declaration that "the courts of one state or country are without jur-
isdiction over title to lands in another state.10 2 True as this state-
ment may be it almost inevitably leads to the treatment of a foreign
suit in equity as-an action in ren. Probably this process of reason-
ing is unconscious and no court would make so bald a statement; but
the space devoted to the discussion of real actions in these decisions
seems explicable only upon the basis of some confusion in the minds
of the judges.
In fact what is asserted to be necessary to preserve 'exclusive con-
trol' of land really involves two propositions: (i) that the law of the
situs governs the title to land; (2) that no foreign court may apply
the law of situs to any given state of facts and thereby determine a
personal obligation. Let us concede at once that the laws of the
s" Supra, P. 534.
M Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. iS.
82 Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. at p. 132.
9D Carpenter v. Strange, 14! U. S. 87.
9, e. g. Lindley v. O'Reilly, 5o N. J. L. 636.
91Ibid., p. 642.
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situs of the res have the final determination of the nature of the
interests in land, the quantum of estates, the mode of devolution.
Let us concede also that "it is not within the power of one state
to prescribe The mode by which real property shall be conveyed ;,
another."9 3  But the second proposition is not involved in these
concessions.9" The mechanical iteration of statements which no one
contests does not dispose of the question under consideration. Ner-
vous emphasis upon the word 'title,' and exaggeration of merely
formal elements may obscure the real issue. For although it be ad-
mitted that the legal title is governed by the law of the situs and
is not altered by the foreign decree, it by no means follows that the
foreign court may not apply that law and that the decree may not
mediately determine that title. This mediate effect may be realized
in a number of ways. In a well-known passage Mr. Justice BREWER
said : "if all parties interested in the land were before the court of
another State, its decree would be conclusive upon them, and thus
in effect determine the title." That is the precise application which
I am interested in urging.9 6
We need not say that the foreign decree should ex proprio vigore
affect title to domestic land; all that is contended is that the courts
of the situs should recognize such a decree as a final determination
of a personal obligation to convey, an obligation analogous to that
arising from a valid contract. It should be accepted as a valid cause
of action in the jurisdiction of the situs, and if suit be brought upon
it and personal jurisdiction obtained of the person bound, a new de-
cree should be rendered. But, it is said,97 "the doctrine that juris-
diction respecting lands in a foreign state is not in rem but only in
personam is bereft of all practical force if the decree in personam
is conclusive and must be enforced by the courts of the situs." If
this means that the courts of the situs cannot be compelled to issue
process upon a foreign decree, no one will dissent; but if it implies
that the foreign decree cannot be made the foundation of a new
decree without violent infraction of settled doctrines, it may well
give us pause. Would such acceptance of the foreign decree violate
any sound policy of the sovereignty of the situs? Does the dogma
'*McLean, J. in Watts v. Waddle et al., 6 Peters 389.
" Cf. The Earl of Kildare v. Eustace, i Vern. 405, 429, where it was said with refer-
ence to a trust of Irish land that "the judges of England were proper expositors of the
Irish laws."
0 Dull v. Blackman, 169 U. S. 243, 246.
"The principle was accepted in Swaizie v. Swaizie, 31 Ont. 324; NMiles v. Lee, 169
Mich. 474, 483; and in Burnley v. Stevenson, Dunlap v. Byers, and Mallette v. Schecrer,
which have already been considered.
91 Magie, J. in Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. at p. 569.
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that a foreign decree cannot affect the title to domestic land mean
anything more than that it must first be established as a 'judgment'
in a court where the land lies? Does any court maintain in its
integrity the doctrine that real property is 'exclusively within the
control' of the local sovereignty? Let us see.
in Fall v. Fall"" the court said: "If Fall had obeyed the order of
the Washington court and made a deed of conveyance to his wife
of the Nebraska land, even under threat of contempt proceedings, or
after duress of imprisonment, the title thereby conveyed to Mrs.
Fall would have been of equal weight and dignity with that which
he possessed at the time of the execution of the deed." The same
concession will be made by other courts which refuse to accept the
foreign decree. In fact it is believed that no decision will be found
in which a deed, made under the compulsion of a foreign decree, was
for that reason held invalid by a court of the situs of the land.
9
Undoubtedly such an enforced admission is disconcerting. It is
responsible for our last and most desperate distinction: 'it is the
conveyance, not the decree, which affects the title to domestic
land." 0 But if the decree did not deal rightfully and constitutionally
with the title to domestic land, the deed would be voidable for
duress.101 The validity of the deed cannot be admitted without an
implicit acceptance of the decree; for the validity of the conveyance
involves the same considerations which determine the validity of the
foreign decree itself to fix equities in domestic land so as to be bind-
ing upon the person.0 2 How then can any court which accepts the
deed deny that the decree determined an obligation? What becomes
of the vaunted declaration that the foreign decree cannot affect do-"
mestic land? Unless comfort can be found in a formal lifeless dis-
tinction, the inconsistency will inevitably demand an abandonment
of the position. The decree is valid, if by process of coercion a deed
is produced; it is invalid, if no deed. In other words the success
or failure of the coercive process determines the validity of the de-
' 75 Neb. at p. 128.
" In Steele v. Bryant (Ky. izg), 116 S. W. 755, such a deed was upheld as a
valid conveyance.
'1 Fuller, C. J., in Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87, io6; Zabriskie, C. in Davis
v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. io5, 120; Magic, J. in Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. 3. Eq. 56!,
566. This artless explanation must excite eternal wonder.
0'In Gilliland v. Inzabit, 92 Iowa 46, a deed to Iowa land was sought to be avoided
on the ground of duress. The grantor was ordered by a court of equity of Kentucky
to execute the deed. For refusing so to do he was committed for contempt and after
several days' imprisonment executed the deed as required by the decree. The court
held that as the Kentucky court had jurisdiction of the person of the grantor, the
deed made under compulsion of its decree was not made under duress.
101 Sedgwick, C. J. in Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. at p. i5o; 70 Cent. Law Journ. 2.
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cree. As for the policy of the state,10 8 it can have no interest in the
forms of procedure; all that the state can be legitimately interested
in is that no change is made in its law of property, and that the mode
of transfer complies with its laws. Its exclusive control is exclusi-P
in name only, so long as it admits the deed; for the state is no more
deprived of control of its property by acceptance of the foreign de-
cree than by admission of the deed. The foreign decree is like the
foreign judgment in that it requires a new adjudication to give it
extra-territorial effect. The-domestic court is required simply to
enforce its own decree by process conforming to the laws of the
forum. The foundation of the decree, it is true, is the personal ob-
ligation created by a foreign decree; but the fact that this obliga-
tion concerns domestic land is no obstacle, unless the court is pre-
pared to hold that no similar obligation can be created by contract or
trust made beyond the territorial boundaries of the state.
V
The history of this small problem is characteristic of the de-
velopment of equity. Chancery begins with an ill-defined and un-
certain jurisdiction; its doctrines are challenged as vague and vari-
able. The common lawyer would fain put a curb on the chancel-
lor's power, and he seizes on the fact that chancery is not a coura of
record to distinguish rigidly between decrees and judgments. The
distinction as it first appears is fundamental and in its way log-
ical. But what is perhaps appropriate in the' seventeenth century
becomes incongruous in the nineteenth. The transition is well stated
by Mr. Justice DANIEL :'14
"We are aware that at one period courts of equity were
said not to be courts of record, and their decrees were not
allowed to rank with judgments at law, with respect to con-
flicting claims of creditors or in the administration of estates;
but these opinions, the fruits of jealousy in the old common
lawyers, would now hardly be seriously urged, and much less
seriously admitted, after a practice so long and so well set-
tled, as that which confers on courts of equity in cases of
difficulty and intricacy in the administration of estates, the
power of marshalling assets, and in the exercise of that
103 In an obscure passage in the majority opinion in Fall v. Bastin, 215 U. S. at
p. io, it seems to be recognized that the acceptance of the foreign decree would do no
violence to the policy of the state.
'
0 4
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power the right of controlling the order In which creditors,
either legal or equitable, shall be ranked in the prosecution of
their claims. The relative dignity of courts and the binding
effect of their decrees, when given within the pale of their
regular constitution and jurisdiction, are no longer subjects
for doubt or question."
The recognition of the decree for money came as the culmination
of a long struggle: it involved a breach with the classic tradition.
Once the tradition was broken, recognition might well have been
extended to the decree for conveyance. It would require no logical
extension and, as we have seen, some courts have not failed to per-
ceive that a due recognition of equity demanded it. But the jealous
solicitude of the courts in 'protecting' a domestic res from inter-
ference by a foreign court, and the tendency to regard the legal
judgment as the norm and the equitable decree as anomolous, com-
bined to produce a distinction between decrees.
Distinctions are necessary and inevitable in any legal system, es-
pecially one founded upon precedent, but it is perilous to preserve
distinctions for themselves alone, for the delight in legal subtlety.
If a generalization may be attempted, with full knowledge that all
generalizations are imperfect, we may say that the development of
Anglo-American law exhibits progressively the annihilation of ar-
bitrary distinctions. It was only through the overriding of a myriad
local customs that England evolved a common law, and the spirit
of Bracton, its greatest expositor, is antipathetic to artificial, arbi-
trary distinctions which sacrifice the protection of rights to the pres-
ervation of the forms of remedy.
10 5 Later the law crystallizes and
the Year Books are full of wearisome technical disputations, but
when Assumpsit finally triumphed over Debt a multitude of distinc-
tions went down. The eighteenth century shows faint sympathy for
the "diversities" that so delighted Littleton and Coke; it was a con-
temporary of Lord Mansfield who remarked pointedly that courts
"ought not to listen to nice distinctions that savour of the sophistry
of schools, but be guided by true good sense and manly reason."'
0
I have endeavored to show that the rejection of the foreign de-
cree for conveyance rests upon arbitrary and unneccessary distinc-
tions. It is not warranted by logic nor policy. Much effort has been
spent in depicting the evil consequences that will follow the
admission of the foreign decree. It is no coincidence that the courts
105 Cf. Bracton, f. 413b: "Tot erunt formulae brevium quot sunr genera actionum."
10OWilmot, J. in Zoucs v. WoolSton (776t), 2 Burr. xx36, 1147.
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of New Jersey, which are now so concerned in the protection of their
land, resisted stoutly the acceptance of the foreign decree for money
and pictured in melancholy tones the disastrous results of a different
view. 07 It is believed that the danger involved in accepting tl-.
decree, where the deed is now accepted is equally imaginary.
But it is not simply a question of logic and consistency. This is
after all one country although there are separate states. 108 So fatf
as possible remedial agencies should be unified by making them op-
erate throughout the land. That one may escape the operation of a
judicial decree by going into another state is surely a reproach to
any system of legal administration. If the passage of events has
taught us the advantage of unity, no agency albeit unspectacular
which makes for such an end, should be despised. The recognition
of the decree of one state throughout the union would not alone
carry out the true idea of a common country, 109 but would at the
same time give due recognition to equity as a co-ordinate part of one
legal system. Considerations of policy as well as logic and history
seem to demand it. This would be so if the constitution were si-





o e.g. Van Buskirk v. Mulock. iS N. J. L. 184.
10 Cf. Note in 3z Harv. Law Rev. 646, where in commenting on a recent decision
it is said: "The case represents the culmination of a tefidency evinced in decisions of
federal courts for the past decade to disregard state lines when, in the interest of effi-
cient administration of justice, it is necessary to do so. While the principle is undoubt-
edly contrary to classical thought on the subject, it should ,be welcomed by progressive
jurists as a wholesome innovation."
10 Cf. Stiness, C. J. in Wagner v. Wagner, 26 R. I. 27, 28.
"0 See W. W. Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 28 Yale Law Journ. 421. If Congress can be induced to exert the power which
Professor Cook has shown very clearly it possesses by virtue of the clause referred to,
the recognition of the equitable decree may be made mandatory.
